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Abstract: In a critical contribution to contemporary rights conversations, Blattberg argues that “human
rights talk” is simply too “thin” (2009). In particular, he argues that a flaw in scholarly conversations is
the move to abstraction: the human is insufficient because it is impersonal. Blattberg lodges this criticism
against a host of liberal thinkers, including Nussbaum and Walzer, and contends that the move to
abstraction hinders calls to justice insofar as it fails to invest actors in the plights of other people. Yet,
even as Blattberg calls to personalize the people to be protected, he does not elaborate on how to flesh out
the people onto whom rights should be mapped. Moreover, in suggesting that the abstract human needs
personalization, Blattberg elides more radical rethinkings: why not replace the human in human rights
altogether?
I draw on the language of Moroccan Islamists to contend that the abstract human that Blattberg
interrogates is but one possible foundation for a rights-based discourse. Moroccan Islamists articulate a
rights discourse that does away with both the abstract human and the empathetic person, instead centering
God and God’s injunctions. Differently put: whereas “rights” emerge from the variously constructed
human assumed by secular arguments, for Islamists “rights” are authorized and circumscribed by God’s
Will as interpreted from the Qur’an and hadith. I analyze ordinary language interviews with over 100
Islamists from Morocco’s two most popular groups and argue that my interlocutors not only displace the
human from “human rights,” but also, correspondingly, revise the meaning and practice of specifically
instantiated human rights—e.g., what practices of religious freedom ought to look like. Finally, I submit
that an Islamist vision of rights not only expands the Muslim tradition, but also should be read as a
criticism of both the practical and abstract components of liberal articulations of rights.
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Biography: Dr. Ahmed Khanani is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at Indiana University, where he is in
the process of completing a book manuscript that explores how Moroccan Islamists articulate and embody
democracy. Ahmed’s research in Morocco was funded by several grants, including a FLAS, a Fulbright,
and a POMEPS travel grant.

